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THE JAINA GAZETTE

Vol. XIX } No 5. } MADRAS, MAY 1923. { WHOLE { No. 215.

He who studies nature's laws,
From certain truth his maxim draws.

—*Gay.*

Some Speculations regarding the Syadvada.

REFERRING to pages 178 and following of Muni Nyayavijaya's "*Nyāya-Kusumānjali*".

(1) *Syadasti.* Somehow the jar does exist.

As explained by the late Virchand R. Gandhi the *syadvada* is as follows up to *syat avaktavyah* :—

How should we express ourselves when we make any statement about a thing? This mode of expression applies (i. e. the *syadvada* applies) not only to the substance, but also to *gunas* and *paryayas*, qualities and modifications.

There are seven modes of expressing the is-ness or is-not-ness of a thing. These modes are all inter-related, and each presupposes the others, and when we accept all these seven, then only do we speak correctly. Each one implies the other modes. The doctrine that in order to know a thing we must express it in these seven modes is called *syadvada*.

In any thing there is *astita* (existence or presence) of its own *paryayas* (modifications) and there is *nastita* (non-existence or absence) of the *paryayas* (modifications) of other objects. The

two factors exist simultaneously, presence of its own and absence of another thing's *paryayas*. Therefore, when we have to express the fact that there is *astita* of its own *paryayas* we should say "*syat*" there is *astita* of its own *paryayas*; we should prefix "*syat*". "*Syat*" means that it presupposes that there are other aspects, other modes of expression. *Syat* is an adverb.

Another reason for prefixing *syat* is that while a certain set of *paryayas* is being expressed, or spoken of, they are changing, and another set is coming into existence.

For instance, in a jar there is the existence of its own *paryayas*, and the existence of *nastita* (absence of the *paryayas* of other objects). In order to show that there are the *nastita paryayas* in the jar we should prefix the word "*syat*" to the statement that there are the *astita paryayas*. By doing this we do not mislead.

(2) *Syannasti* is the second mode of expression. For instance, *Syat* a jar is not a non-jar. There are the non-paryayas of other things in the jar. And this mode of expression implies the first mode.

(3) These two facts exist simultaneously. We cannot express this fact in words. It takes time to give expression; therefore we must say *syatavaktavyah*. This is the third mode of expression. It is impossible to express in words the fact; one set of *paryayas* exists and the set of the *paryayas* of another thing does not exist in the one thing, jar for instance. The two sets exist simultaneously but we cannot express this fact in words.

These three modes of expression have reference to the whole of the thing that we take into consideration. The last four of the seven modes refer to the parts of things.

That is as far as the subject was explained by Mr. V. R. Gandhi.

(4) Page 179—*Syadasti-nasti*: It is certain that from a certain point of view the jar exists, as well as from another standpoint it does not exist.

Is and is not are copulas joining some predicate to a subject. The thing is and is not,—and then some particular predicate must follow. The predicate is the same, but the point of view is not the same. It can be said, for instance, that the thing is and is not

black; the sweep's face, for instance, is and is not black. It is black (by reason of the soot that is on it), and wants washing. If the sweep is a white man then his face is not black, as can be proved by washing. So the sweep's face is and is not black according to the way in which we are thinking about it. Another illustration: the sea is and is not salt. This is true according to the way in which we are looking at it. The sea is salt; this is quite true, we cannot drink it; it is too salt. The sea is not salt; this also is true. Salt is a white powder, the sea is water and not a white powder. So we can say the sea is and is not salt. The meanings are different, but both meanings are true of the sea. The jar is and is not existing, does and does not exist. The jar does exist where it is, and it does not exist in other places. I am not sure, however, whether this last illustration is correct, because this asti-nasti mode of expression is said to refer to the parts of things, as distinguished from expressions which refer to the whole thing. As far as the sweep's face is concerned, one part (the soot) is black, while the other part (the face itself) is not black. And as far as the sea is concerned, one part (the salt in it) is salt, and the other part (the water) is not salt.

There are many other predicates which can be placed following the two copulas is and is not, for instance the jar is and is not permanent, is and is not one, is and is not separate from the shelf on which it stands. It is permanent so far as it is a jar, but it is changing every moment in its modifications, it changes its place, it changes its colour according to daylight or artificial light, its weight according to whether full or empty, its relations to other things as they move about. It is one jar, but many parts, top, bottom, lid, body, inside, outside, this part and that part. It is separate from the shelf as far as the parts which are not touching the shelf are concerned, while the part of the jar that touches the shelf on which it stands is not separate from the shelf.

(5) *Syadastiavaktavyah* :—(Page 179). It is a fact that from a particular consideration the jar exists and somehow it is also inexpressible.

Syad asti avaktavyah :—The things that can be said of a jar are infinite. Only one thing can be said at a time. Yet at that

time all the other possible predicates are true of the jar. It is thus obvious that it is impossible to express the infinity of things at a time. That is to say, what a jar is cannot be expressed in words. The jar is breakable, heavy, brown, in the cupboard, empty, cold, new, glass, upsidedown, and is used for keeping coffee berries in. While any one of these predicates is being made of the jar all the others are also true of it, and there is no word in the language that will express all the possible affirmative predicates. The fact that the predicates can be made one after another does not alter the inexpressibility of the positive total is-ness of the jar, because while any one predicate is being made all the other affirmative predicates are true but are not mentioned and by the time they can be mentioned they will be past and not present facts, and may even be changed and gone out of existence. The jar that was empty when we began to talk about it may be full when we have done talking about it.

But while all the is-ness of a thing cannot be expressed in words, all the is-ness of a thing can be known by a knower.

This predication of inexpressibility is only one of seven possible modes of expression about the thing, and while the inexpressibility is being predicated all the other six possible modes of expression are implied; hence the necessity for using some such adverb as "*syat.*" Each one implies all the others. Each mode of expression implies all the other six modes. This fact is brought to mind by the use of the adverb '*syat.*'

I think the above is the meaning of *syat asti avaktavyah.* Is it ?

Let us say it all again. From the point of view of the parts, aspects, and relations of a thing, it is impossible to express in words what it is. It is so many things and there is no one word which will express them all at once in one breath ; and even if there were still it would be true that the thing's is-ness would be inexpressible, because even the shortest sentence takes time to get from the subject to the predicate and the thing is changing every moment both as to its relations to other things and as to its own conditions.

(6) *Syatnasti avaktvyah* :—"Surely, somehow the jar does not exist and is also inexpressible."

From the point of view of all the parts, aspects, and relation of the jar it is impossible to express in words what the jar is not. Speaking of the parts of the jar we cannot express in words all that the jar is not.

There is an infinity of things that the jar is not, and although the various things that the jar is not can be mentioned one after another, still at the moment of mentioning any one of these things all the other things co-exist and yet are not mentioned and cannot be mentioned. The jar is not wood, cracked, full, on the table, right way up, yellow, is not more than one jar, is not stolen, and is not used for putting tea in. All this co-existing absence of facts cannot be expressed simultaneously in words, cannot be expressed in words at all, because if expressed in succession, each fact is in reality accompanied by all the other facts which are not spoken at the time, and when they come to be spoken then the other facts which have already been mentioned are not present but past facts. So that it is impossible when speaking of the parts and aspects of a thing to express in words what the thing is not, that is to say the is-not-ness of the thing. Further, what the thing is not, is so numerous that it would take a month to express it all in words and even then its is-not-ness would not be exhausted.

As well as predicating the inexpressibility of the is-not-ness of a thing so far as its parts are concerned it is possible to use six other modes of expression about the thing, and to remind us of this fact the word "*syat*" is mentioned to remind us that all the other possible six modes of expression are implied while we are speaking, while we are using the one mode.

(7) *Syadasti nasti avaktavyah* :—Some how the jar exists, does not exist, and is inexpressible as well from a certain standpoint.

The jar is and is not glass (one part is glass, but the lid is of metal and Indiarubber), is and is not permanent (from the dravya point of view it is permanent while from the *paryaya* point of view it is changing), is and is not one (in so far as it is a jar it is one jar, but it is many atoms of matter, also it is one jar, but three substances, glass, metal, and brureb), is and is not in contact with the shelf in the cupboard (the top of it, when it is upside-down is touching the shelf while the bottom of the jar when upside-down is not

touching the shelf), and there are infinite other things that the jar is and is not, from the point of view of its parts and aspects and relations. It is obviously impossible to express all this is-and-is-not-ness in words, because though co-existing simultaneously it can only be expressed successively and the facts are changing all the time, it is getting older every moment, its relations to other things are changing every moment; it is therefore impossible to express in words all the predicates that the jar can be said to be and not to be from its different aspects and parts and relations to other things.

This inexpressibility is only one out of seven possible modes of speaking about the jar, and the word "*syat*" is used to remind us of this fact, the fact that while this one mode is being used, six other modes of talking about the jar can be used, and are therefore implied in the one expression.

Will some reader kindly correct, confirm, or add to the foregoing speculations?

H WARREN.

The Idea of God in Jainism.

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(*Continued from p. 107, March No.*)

Before starting our critical analysis of the Jaina idea of God, we must make clear to ourselves, about the *real*, and not theological, relation between both the categories. It does not need any proof, that the theory of paramatman being god in the sense of other religions originated in Jaina philosophy, mainly in its logics, in order to fill the place in the supreme sphere, but it is not without a foundation in the plain belief of the people. It is quite evident not only from the Jaina works but also from non-Jaina literature,

that the Jinas or Tirthankaras were very early worshipped as gods* It is only a logical conclusion if *all* the muktas are considered as gods.

The worship of devas is, however, only a concession to the popular belief, based on the early Hinduism. The elaboration of the system of the deva-hierarchy is due again to the logical inclinations of the Jainas. The selection of the devas for the Jaina Pantheon is perhaps due to this working of Jaina logic reflecting in itself partly also the history of its development. At the same time the various sources are reflected in this Pantheon in the same way as in Hinduism. But while the Hinduism is fully unconscious of the origin of the various elements of its Pantheon, the Jaina doctrine seems to be quite aware of the fact, that gods of various origin and of various racial sources came together to compose a new celestial hierarchy. This can be the only meaning of the classification of devas in the Bhavana-vasins, Vyantaras, Jyotiskas and Vaimanikas.

Jyotiska-devas appear to be of pure Aryan origin brought to India from the pre-Indian seats of the Hindus as we see quite clearly comparing them with the western Aryan religions, that the idea of supposing animation in celestial phenomena is purely Aryan.** The Bhavana-vasins represent the Vedic Gods, as they had developed under the influence of the non-Aryan aborigines in India proper, the proof of it being the occurrence of the names like Naga. Suparna etc. which were in the Indian languages at first the

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* Specially the early English accounts on Jainism describe it as polytheistic and idolatristic system of religion, because they confounded already the worship of the Tirthankaras with the idol worship of some of the Hindu sects. On this subject *cf.* Nyaya Kusumanjali by Nyayavijaya 35 and 36, quotations of which are given below in the note 34. Prof. H.R. Kapadiya in the commentary to this book gives the ideas about the worship of Tirthankaras as Gods specially p 267. For the idea, that Tirthankara is a religious authority par excellence *cf.* ibid p. 36 quoted already above in the note 9 at the end.

** This development of religious ideas can be seen at best in Greek religion. Next to it the Indo-Aryan and Slavonic religions while the old German religion produced by the same process a more uniform religious form.

names for some of the Indian aborigines, and later on the denominations of their gods, who intruded in the meantime into the original twofold (animistic and physical :) Pantheon of the Aryan Hindus, so that it is very difficult to trace their origin in modern times, when most of the old traditions have been lost, having been substituted by modern constructions.

The Vyantaras are undoubtedly of non-Aryan origin, accepted, of course, through the medium of later Hindu belief, although there are also among them beings which are again undoubtedly of Aryan origin, as e.g., the Gandharvas* But such exceptions only signify, that they were not accepted directly, but through the medium of a prevalently Aryan religion, developed in India, where the assimilative process of joining different heterogenous religious elements had been already accomplished.

The Vaimanikas seem to be of the most recent date in that Pantheon, from which they have been accepted by the Jainas, as they show all the features of an artificial philosophical construction.**

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* The question of the origion of the Gandharvas is not so easy, as it might seem to somebody. It is certain the Max Mullers etymology of the word cannot be held further more, as it is not tenable from the religious and archaeological point of view. If we observe Indian sculptures representing the Gandharvas, we find more similarity in them to the Persian and Babylonian winged lions and dragons, than to the Greek Kentauroi, which are half horse and half man. Therefore I venture to say that the Gandharvas are originally non-Aryan, even if the word itself *is* Aryan.

** This opinion is chiefly based on Tattvarthadhigama Sutram IV. 16—19.

"*vaimānikāh.*" 16 "*kalpopapannāh kalpātītāśca.*" 17. "*uparyupari.*" 18.

"*saudharmaiśāna-sānatkumāra-māhendra-brahma-brahmottara-lāntava-*

kāpīshtha-śukra-mahāśukra-satāra sahasrāre-shvānata-

prānatayor - āranācyutayor - navasu graiveyakeshu vijaya-vaijayan-ta-

jayantāparājiteshu sarvārthe siddhau ca." 19.

The only explanation for the reasons, why these undoubtedly non-Jaina gods have been accepted into the Jaina system seems to me to be the necessity to satisfy the common people and accord with its inherited customs and religious needs. It is certain that the Jaina philosophers do not attribute too much importance to this secondary Pantheon. It is very seldom dealt with in their treatises, although they dwell rather profoundly on the subject of the liberated souls and their godly attributes involved in the idea of their perfectness*.

Briefly recapitulating, what has been explained in detail, it is clear that the Jainas originally recognised as god only the liberated soul (mukta-jiva) : simultaneously as a metaphysical unity and as a differentiated multitude of individual souls, from which was developed the theological doctrine of the worship of particular liberated ones, who have had a part in the evolution of the world having attained the perfect knowledge *bodhi* before their final liberation, and who are called Jinas or Tirthankaras.

The building of the secondary Pantheon of devas, who are considered by the Jainas as lower deities is most probably a product of the popular belief, which has been accepted later on in Jaina dogmatics for the sake of keeping unity in the community.** And once having got into the dogmatics, they were thoroughly assimilated into the leading idea of the doctrine and in that way they lost all the individual details of the several religions, from which they had been borrowed, and were developed, by the usual means of all dogmatics, into a perfectly organic element of the Jaina doctrine. From the view of Jaina dogmatics the devas are only a stage in individual development, not necessarily superior to

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* Cf. e.g., Motichand Jhaverchand Mehta's Introduction to the Adhyatma-Tattvaloka by Nyayavijaya p. VIII ff. Or Prof. H. R. Kapadiya's commentary to the Nyaya Kusumanjali by Nyayavijaya p. 267, and on other places. All these modern commentators use always the English word God only for Tirthankaras and other liberated souls, and very seldom speak at all about the devas.

** The first *dogmatical* treatment of the theory of the devas which deals with the matter systematically, seems to me the Chapter IV of the Tattvarthadhigama Sutra. The older sources give only more or less mythological account of the devas.

men, This point of view resembles very much the Buddhistic idea on this subject, although both are not perfectly identical, a matter which I shall explain below in more details.

In the above explanation the elements of the Jaina belief in god are given so that they might form the basis of a solution of the question, whether there is something in the Jaina doctrine that corresponds to the ideas in the other religions, which we are accustomed to characterize by the word "god," or "gods" if there are many.

It is not an easy matter to answer this question, principally owing to the uncertainty of the notion. As it has already been explained, the Jaina devas are primary gods, but they are apparently not recognised as the highest beings by the doctrine of to-day. It is not absolutely necessary for god to be the highest being, as in all religions which recognise many gods there is a subordination of the beings, who are all recognised as gods. The essential is perfectness and absolutness, and it seems from the quoted chapter of Tatv̆arthadhigama Sutra that the Jaina doctrine does not attribute these qualities to the devas, who are not necessarily muktas. Moreover, it seems that they are *never* considered as muktas*. They are simply the result of a long process of the confluence and contamination not only of the elements of different religions but also of the different strata of the same religion. I do not suppose the doctrine of the devas is as old as Mahavira, but I am rather of the opinion that it is a much more modern concession to the popular belief, owing to the growth of Hinduism

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* That is quite clear from the whole of Chapter IV, of the Tattvarthadhigama-Sutra. Cf. also Nyaya-Kusumanjali by Nyaya-vijaya V. 24, p. 333, where he says.

"*bhūpānām balividvishām halabhritām cakreśvarānām punar.*
devānāmapi vajrinām bhavati yah prīnnidrāśarmodayah
siddhānām parameśanām sakalabhūśringa samājagmushām
śuddhānandamahodayasya mahato nanantabhāge pyasau."

"That happiness which the kings, the *Vasudevas*, the *Baladevas*, the *Chakravartis* and the *Indras* enjoy is not even the infinitessimal part of the unsullied and perfect bliss that is enjoyed by the *Siddha Parameshvaras* who have reached the summit of the universe."

after the decay of Buddhism in India*. Therefore, I think the devas cannot be considered either as an independent and original element of the Jaina religion or as an equivalent of the notion represented by the word "god."

The only idea of the Jaina religion which can be compared properly with the notion "god," is the idea of the perfectly liberated one. The perfect liberation involves the attainment of absolute perfectness, which is really attributed to the muktas by the Jaina doctrine** although the enumeration of the qualities which compose the idea of perfectness, is not complete in the Jaina doctrine $ In particular two qualities, which are generally attributed to gods,

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* That does not mean, that the devas have been perfectly unknown to the Jaina doctrine before that time, but their part in the religion was very small, even obscure, and they grew more prominent, when the original manner of thinking, from which as a natural result Mahavira's reform as well as the doctrine of Buddha arose, changed by the influence of rising Hinduism.

** That is pointed in a very strong way by Nyayavijaya in his Nyaya-Kusumanjali IV. 32., by negation of the opposite qualities, thus :

"*rāgī cetparameśvaro gururapi brahmavratād-bhrashtavān*
dharmo nishkaruno bhavettadahaha kleśah kiyān ucyate ?
mādhyasthyena vicāranāt-tu hṛidaye dambholilepāyate
nīrāgo bhagavān guruś-caritavān dharmah kripātmetyadah. 32.

"Alas, what a great calamity will follow if God were passionate, a preceptor fallen from the vow of celibacy and religion void of compassion ! If we think over this impartially we feel certain that God must be devoid of passions, preceptor exemplary in conduct and religion completely based upon compassion."

Cf. also the above quoted verses from different sources on the subject of Paramatma, Siddha, etc.

$ An exhaustive account of them is given by Nyayavijaya in his Nyaya-Kusumanjali V, 22-23.

"*vartante trijagat-svarūpa-vishayānanta-prabodhātmakā*
vijnānavaranasya nirhananato nāśacca dṛishtyāvṛiteh
antāgocaradharśana-prasṛimara-prodbhāsarūpam gatā
mohasya pralayāt gatā anupame samyaktva cāritrake. 22.

"*saukhyam vīryamanantamapyupagatā vedyāntarāyakshaye*
'*mūrtānantavigāhanā pralayato nām:aśca gotrasya ca*
āyush kasya niśubhmato '*kshayagatim samprāptavantah punnah*
siddhās tatra maheśvarā iti bhaved eshā parā nirvṛitih. 23.

are wanting, viz.. omnipresence and omnipotence. Muktas of the Jainas are confined to the supreme place in heaven, where they remain immovable without interfering with the worldy doings of men.* It must be understood that they cannot interfere with the karmic matter, as the idea of perfect liberation involves the

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"That is *Para-Mukti* the second type of liberation which the great lords, the *Siddhas* enjoy the Siddhas who have acquired the eight qualities (1) infinite knowledge shedding light on all the objects of the three worlds and (2) infinite perception by destroying the *Jnanavaraniya* and *Darśanavaraniya Karmans* who have attained (3) the matchless *Samyaktva* and *Charitra* by annihilating the *Mohaniya Karmans*, who have secured (4) infinite happiness and (5) power by destroying the *Vedaniya* and *Antaraya Karmans*, who have attained (6) *Amurttata* and (7) infinite *Avagahana* by annihilating the *Nama* and *Gotra Karmans* and who have reached (8) the imperishable state by destroying the Ayushya *Karmans*.

Avagahana means impenetrability. In virtue of this quality one liberated soul can allow others to exist without obstruction, just as the light of one lamp does not prevent the interpenetration of the light of other lamps. H. R. Kapadiya ibid. p. 329. The eight attributes are also given in *Panchāstikāya-Samayasāra* 37, although in a more condensed form, yet not so clearly :

"*sassa damadha ucchedam bhavvamabhavvam ca sunnam idaram ca,*
vinnanamavinnanam na vijujjadi asadi sabhāve.

37. That he is infinite in perfection and yet finite with reference to temporal life, that he is born into perfection and yet dead from Samsara ; that he is the negation of all extrinsic qualities and still the affirmation of his own intrinsic nature ; that he has knowledge perfect and yet devoid of knowledge imperfect ; these eight attributes will not be associated with him if Nirvana is interpreted nihilistically."

Very good explanation of the eight qualities of the liberated souls is offered by Sarat Chandra Ghoshal in his Commentary to Davva-Samgaha v. 14. p. 42-44. Sacred Books of the Jainas I.

* Cf. Panchastikaya-Samayasara 79.

"*payaditthidi anubhāgappadesa bandhehim savvado mukko,*
uddam gacchadi sesā vidisāvajjam gadim jamti. 79.

"79. When Jiva gets liberated from the bonds of Karma which are of different aspects of substance, duration and fertility, and extensity, he reaches the summit of the upper world. Others who are in Samsara move about in all the directions except the four diagonal corners."

discontinuation of everything, connected with solid matter and with the causal circles of karmas, constituting the potential power in this matter.* From this point of view the muktas do not possess all the godly qualities, as we are accustomed to attribute them to the " God."

But, according to the Jaina doctrine, the muktas possessed these qualities just before they reached nirvana.** And these two qualities are not considered by them to be at all necessary for absolute perfectness. Moreover, it seems to be the last imperfectness before reaching the real perfectness ; it is the last stage in the development of the perfect one.

But these difficulties are only of a dogmatic character and of secondary importance, as we shall see immediately, when we start to consider the whole matter purely from the metaphysical standpoint. $

Also cf. Nyaya-Kusumanjali V. 21.

" *jīvā ūrdhvagatisvabhāvasahitā apyāvṛitipreranāt,*
tiryagyāmtyadha eva vā dhaityah syuh pudgrlāścardhvagāh,
lokāgram samupagatastu bhagavān nāyātyadho gauravā
bhāvātprerakamantarena na punah kurvita tiryaggatim." *21.*

" Souls even though they have the natural tendency of going upwards, go slantwise or downwards as they are directed by *Karmans* ; and the matter which has the tendency of going downwards goes up in case a force is exerted. The divine soul that has reached the topmost part of *Loka*, does not come down as it has no weight and it does not go crosswise as there is none to direct it so."

* Cf. Dravya-Samgraha 14.

" *nikkammā aṭṭagunā kimcūnā caramadehado siddhā,*
loyaggaṭhidā niccā uppādavayehi samjuttā." *14.*

" The Siddhas or liberated Jivas are void of Karmas, possessed of eight qualities, slightly less than final body, eternal, possessed of Utpada rise and Vyaya fall, and existent at the summit of Loka.

** Cf. Prof. H. R. Kapadiya's Commentary on Nyaya-Kusumanjali p. 35.

$ It is done by the force of the rememberance of his deeds previous to the final liberation, by his good example, by the authority of his teachings, which still leads the people on the right way etc. Cf. Nyaya-Kusumanjali IV, 33. In a way a Siddha is also directly possessed of omnipotence, or rather said of infinite power, which they attain by destroying the *Antaraya Karman*. Cf. Nyaya Kusumanjali v. 23. quoted in page 139.

Therefore, it is not difficult also from the Jaina metaphysical point of view to attribute to the liberated soul the perfectness which is acknowledged by the Jaina dogmatics. Thus the idea of god being the liberated soul, siddha, has been introduced into Jainism.

But it is a question, whether this interpretation is really acknowledged by the religion itself, viz., people's religion and whether it was always acknowledged by both the Jaina religion and doctrine. It is the fact that nowhere in the really old Jaina scriptures are the liberated souls called by any name, which in sanskrit means etymologically god, but always only by such names as indicate that the beings are possessed of certain godly qualities or powers.

From this fact it seems to me that the liberated souls were originally *not* considered as gods by the Jainas. That is also evident from the mere fact that the Jaina religion, especially in the last form, as developed by Mahavira, was sharply opposed to the polytheistic forms of the popular Hindu religion, and to the vain ritualistic practices of the Brahmans.* And therefore I am of the opinion that the substitution of the liberated souls for "gods" happened *after* Mahavira, and that it means on one side, a compromise with the people's desire, and, on the other side, an organic

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* For proving this instances also from non-Jaina works can be quoted. Specially the Buddhist scriptures several times mention this feature of Jaina doctrine. e.g. Arguttaranikayo 3., 74 and on other places.

34. Cf. Nyaya-Kusumanjali IV. 36.

"*pūjyā na pratimā rhatāmiti vacah syāt kasya cetavino ?*
nīrūpeśvaramūrttimāracayitā bhrāntah katham neti cet ?
jīvanmuktamaheśamapyupayatām no no idam dushanam
dhyānālambanahetave smṛitikṛite rūpeśabimbo pi san." 36.

"Which thoughtful man would say that the image of *Arhats* must not be worshipped ? If he says that we are mistaken in trying to construct an image of God who is formless, it is not true ; for, this fault is not applicable to us who admit even the *Jivanmukta* as God. Moreover, to construct an image of God who is form-less is good, as it is useful for the purpose of concentration and as it reminds us of the ideal." More clearly is the matter explained in the commentary of Prof. H. R. Kapadiya on these verses p, 267.

result of logical development of the religion by the Jaina philosophers of the latter ages. But this does not by any means signify that there was not an idea of a supreme Perfect One already in the eldest strata of the Jaina religion. But it never was contaminated with the common conception of god, known from the heterodox religions of India.

Why, how, and when this contamination happened it is impossible to determine now, but it seems to me that it is due to western influences, when it seemed expedient to prove the religious character of Jain doctrine to somebody, who was not able to understand that a religion could keep its religious character without the worship of a personal God, as it was known in the western and especially the semitic religions. There was already recognised a body of liberated souls, who exercised their influence on the mankind *before* their attainment of nirvana and who were therefore worshipped by thankful believers as the Vanquishers : (Jinas) : and as Establishers of the Path : (Tirthankaras ;)*. This worship was originally only of that character, which we can see in the reverence of a child towards its parents, and the orthodox opinion up to now is of the same nature**. But the common people went further, and the worship of Tirthankaras assumes very often the character of deva-worship in Hinduism and sometimes sinks even to idol worship in the case of those uneducated.

It is, further more, only a natural conclusion of the Jaina logicians if the worship of Tirthankaras is extended from this kalpa not only to other kalpas too but also to the worship of all liberated souls, even to those, who are not known to us. In this belief there is a door open for accepting into the hierarchy of gods also the godly beings from other religions, mainly from Hinduism.

(To be Continued).

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* Cf. Nyaya-Kusumanjali 1, 10. and the commentary of Pro. H. R. Kapadiya on it, specially p. 36 f.

** This is thoroughly explained in Sangaravasuttam of Majjhimanikaya V. 10. Buddha directly says that the Gods are only supposed and that their existence is not directly proved.

Pramana-naya-tattvalokalamkara

OF

Sri Vadideva Suri.

Translated by ***Harisatya Bhattacharya, M.A., B.L.***

(Continued from page 120 *of Vol. XIX No. 4.)*

Sutra 12.

Its natural function is, like Light, to reveal objects ; but whether the revelation is correct or not, depends on the merit or the demerit of man.

Commentary.

The natural force of a word consists in its power of expressing an object. In this respect, it is similar to Light which also reveals the objects. A Light when lit, reveals all objects near at hand, no matter whether they are good or bad ; just so, does a word, when uttered by a speaker produces in the minds of the hearers, an idea of an object, no matter whether it is real or false, consistent or inconsistent, useful or useless, known or to be known ;—This much is the natural force or function of a word. But the difference between a word and a Light lies in this that whereas the revelation of an object through a word is dependent on the knowledge of the significance of the word, the revelation of an object by a Light is not so dependent.

Whether a word correctly represents reality or is a counterpart of unreality is, however, dependent on the fact whether the speaker is a faultless or a defective being. If the speaker is a right-seer and a pure being, his words would represent truth ; otherwise, words would be counterparts of unreal things. If it be contended that the natural function of a word is to express reality or unreality (and not simply, to express an object), the difficulty would be that in that case there would be no reason why the words of a cheat would be unreliable while those of a good man would be reliable. Generosity etc. are the gcod qualities of a man while envy etc.

are the faults of a bad man. The followers of Jaimini maintain that the reliability of the words does not depend on the good qualities of the speaker; well,—following the same line of argument, may we not contend that faults and demerits in a man cannot make his words unreliable? The good qualities in a man mitigate or suppress his faults and demerits,—and yet they are held to be powerless in making his words reliable,—the Srotriya position is curious indeed!

Sutra 13.

In all cases a word, while expressing its Object, follows the Law of Sevenfold Predication, by its affirmation and negation.

Commentary.

According to the principle of the Jaina philosophy, a thing may be said to have many aspects. Thus, in some sense, it is existent; in some sense again, it is non-existent. Similarly, viewed from one standpoint, a thing is eternal, but viewed from another, it is momentary. As a matter of fact, seven such forms of statement may be made with regard to a thing from seven standpoints. Now, a Word is but a counterpart of the thing and like those of it, a Word also may be said to have seven aspects.

Sutra 14.

The Law of Sevenfold Predication consists in using seven sorts of expression regarding one and the same thing with reference to its particular aspects one by one, without any inconsistency, by means of affirmation and negative statements, made either separately or together,—all these seven expressions being marked with '*in some respects.*'

Commentary.

This is a description of the celebrated doctrine of the Sevenfold Predication. Analysing the description given above, we can thus find out the conditions of the Sapta-bhangi.

1. The seven predications are to be made regarding one and the same thing e. g. Jiva or Animal. The words, 'one and the same thing' prevent the predication being a hundred-fold (i.e. many-fold) one.

2. The seven predications are to be made in reference to one of its various attributes etc. e.g. Existence. Seven propositions, indicating seven different attributes of the given thing, do not constitute the Sapta-bhanga. Attributes or aspects of a thing are infinite in number. If one of such attributes or aspects be taken into consideration, we shall see that seven predications or statements can be made with reference to it. It is thus that predication is said to be Seven-fold and not Infinite-fold. Of course, if it is contended that the attributes or aspects of a thing are infinite in number and that with reference to each one of these attributes and aspects, seven predications can be made and that consequently, Predication may be Infinite-fold,—well, the Jaina philosophers have no objection to that position.

3. Each of these predications must be based on principles of affirmation and negation.

4. The seven predications must be made in such a way that none of them be inconsistent with facts of Perception etc.

5. Each of these statements must be marked with the expression, '*in some respect.*'

6. The predications, as shown already, must be seven in number.

7. Each predication is a proposition.

(To be continued).

Glimpses from the life

OF

Kumar Devendra Prasada Jain.

Born in October 1888, Kumar Devendra Prasada Jain passed away in March 1921, before completing the age of 33 years. Short though his life career had been, it was full of concentrated energy. During the last few years of his life he accomplished what may well be termed wonders having regard to the circumstances in which he was placed. He was a born publisher and the two

chief ambitions of his life were the Establishment of a Central Jain Publishing House, and a Central Jain College. The first he accomplished to an eminent degree. It is left for us to achieve the other.

I have been for the last years anxious to bring out a life history of this most eminent of all Jains who lived and died for Jainism, but have not been able to get together sufficient materials for the work. I propose therefore to publish such extracts from his letters, Diaries, and Memoranda, as may be of interest to his friends and admirers, and may ultimately be of use in the preparations of his biography.

" You know the great, almost too great, considerations and aims that fill and agitate my mind. Heat without, and keen want of soul's food within have half killed me. Duty is our religion. Work is worship. Ungrateful world bites; but my duty is to shake off the bite and swallow the pain like bitter but strengthening poison knowing full well that love feeds the soul with bliss ineffable; but sorrow feeds it with strength and endurance. I care for both and share both. This is the cup of bitterness, and I am drinking deep of it; for in its intoxication lie the depths of truth ever lasting."

The letter is dated May 18. The year is not given there. But some passages go to show that it was 1913. The incidents that gave rise to these thoughts do not appear clearly from the letter. Inquirers will however bring to light the injustice which was done to dear Devendra.

The letter concludes with the following words which alas are as true now as they were when they were written.

" The Jain community is doomed to destruction and cant be preserved if such of things is allowed to continue."

AJIT PRASADA.

The Casket of Gems.

(அருங்கலச்செப்பு.)

Arungalachheppu or the Casket of Gems is an ancient Jaina work in Tamil and deals about the Rules of conduct for laymen. No information is available about the author. The work closely resembles *Ratna-Karanda-Sravakachara* of Sri Samantabhadra Acharya and consists of 180 couplets excluding the opening and the concluding verses.

Text and Translation.

Opening Verse.

முற்ற வுணர்ந்தானை யேத்தி மொழிகுவன்
குற்ற மொன்றில்லா வறம்

Praising Him who has understood the Whole Reality I shall expound the Dharma that has no fault.

நற்காட்சி நன்ஞான நல்லொழுக்க மிம்மூன்றுந்
தொக்க வறச்சொற் பொருள்.

1. Right Perception, Right knowledge and Right conduct together form what is meant by the word Dharma.

மெய்ப்பொரு டேறுதல் நற்காட்சி யென்றுரைப்பர்
எப்பொருளுங் கண்டுணர்ந் தார்.

2. Perception of the reals as they are is called the Right Perception by those who have understood all things.

தலைமகனு நூலு முனியுமிம் மூன்றும்
நிலைமைய வாகும் பொருள்.

3. Master, Scripture and Saint—these three are realities.

Master.

குற்றமொன் றின்றிக் குறைவின் றுணர்ந்தறம்
பற்ற வுரைத்தா னிறை.

4. Master is one Who being without any blemish has understood all without any imperfection and has preached the Dharma clearly.

பசிவியர்ப்பு நீர்வேட்கை பற்றார்வஞ் செற்றங்
கசிவினோ டில்லா னிறை.

5. Master is one who is free from hunger, sweat, thirst attachment, desire, anger, sorrow, etc.

கடையி லறிவின்பம் வீரியங் காட்சி
யுடையா னுலகுக் கிறை.

6. He who has infinite knowledge, infinite bliss, infinite power and infinite perception is the Lord of the Universe.

தெறித்த பறையி னிராகாதி யின்றி
உரைத்தா னிறைவ னறம்.

7. Like a drum that is beaten, the Master preaches the Truth to the world without any desire or hatred in Him.

Scripture.

என்றுமுண் டாகி இறையால் வெளிப்பட்டு
நின்றது நூலென் றுணர்

8. Know that as Scripture which is existing always and is revealed to the World by God.

மெய்ப்பொருள் காட்டி உயிர்கட்க் கரணாகித்
துக்கங் கெடுப்பது நூல்.

9. That is Scripture which reveals the true nature of things and helps the mundane lives in destroying their miseries.

Saint.

இந்தியத்தை வென்றான் தொடர்ப்பாட்டோ டாரம்ப
முந்து துறந்தான் முனி.

10. One who has conquered the *indriyas*, senses and has completely renounced all external and internal attachments is a Saint or Muni.

தத்துவ ஞான நிகழ்ச்சியுஞ் சிந்தையு
முய்த்த விருடிகண் மாண்பு.

11. Understanding the nature of the Tattwas, living in accordance with the prescribed rules of conduct and doing meditation are the praisworthy characteristics of Rishis.

Right Perception.

எட்டு வகையுறுப்பிற் றாகி யியன்றது
சுட்டிய நற்காட்சி தான்.

12. The aforesaid Right Perception has eight *angas* or limbs.

ஐய மவாவே யுவர்ப்பு மயக்கின்மை
மெய்பெற வில்லன நான்கு.

13. Doubtlessness, Desirelessness, Disgustlessness, and non-recognition of false religions are four (of the eight) limbs.

அறப்பழி நீக்க லழிந்தாரைத் தாங்க
லறத்துக் களவள மூன் று.

14. Removing the ridicule on Dharma, Re-establishing those who waver in Right Faith, Entertaining love and respect for those who are in Dharma are three more limbs.

அறத்தை விளக்கலோ டிந்நான்கு மென்ப
திறப்பா டுள்ள வுறுப்பு.

15. Together with the expounding of Dharma these are four more firm limbs.

—*C. S. Mallinath.*

The land and Island of Women.

BY

W. CROOKE, C.I.E.. D. S.C., LITT-D.

" The earliest trace of the legend of the country and Island of Women which I have discovered is that in the story of the fifth adventure of the horse released at the Asvamedha rite in the Mahabharata. The horse " entered a country which was inhabited only by women, and their Rani was named Paramita. And the way in which these women became mothers was this. When men from other regions visited that country for traffic or from curiosity, the women lived with them as their wives; and if a daughter was born it was permitted to live, but a son was killed the moment it was born. And if a man stayed for more than a month in that country he was put to death; and such of the women as were with child remained alive, but such as were not with child burned themselves with his dead body; for which reason every man who could escape ran away after twenty or twenty-five days. When Arjuna arrived in their country, he said to the warriors about him: "This is a marvellous country that the horse has led us to. If we conquer these women we shall obtain no credit thereby; but if we are conquered our disgrace will be greater than can be conceived." In

the end, Arjuna was defeated by the women, and he married their Rani who came with him to Hastinapura. [1]

The Buddhist pilgrim, Hiuen Tsang, (A. D. 629) describes the country called Po-lo-hih-mo-pu-lo, which is the name of the country of the Eastern Women. The husband of the reigning woman is called king, but he knows nothing of the affairs of the state. The men manage the wars and sow the land, that is all [2]. The name used by the pilgrim is identified as Brahmapura [3]. The Chinese name of the region was Kinchi. It is the land known as the Amazon country and that called Mushika [4]. Wilson identified the Women's Kingdom as Bhot, the Strirajya or Women's Kingdom, and Mushika, "the land of thieves," with the pirate coast of Malabar. Other Chinese reports corroborate the existence of this Kingdom of the Amazons [5].

The same pilgrim also describes the Country of the Western Women, a place in Persia, the abode of the western demons, who by intercourse with a girl of southern India "engendered a clan of female children," and therefore the land is now called the Country of the Western Women [6].

The story about Brahmapura seems to be based on the loose marriage customs which even now prevail in Tibet, like the Muta or temporary marriage of the Shia Musalmans [7]. The story of the Western Women is repeated by Marco Polo, whose editor, the late Sir H. Yule, has a learned note on the position of the Male and Female Islands [8]. Mr. W. Logan [9] has shown good reason for believing that the Island of Women is Minicoy, an island attached to the Malabar District, politically included in the Laccadive group

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1 J. T. Wheeler, *History of India*, i, 400 pp.
2 S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western world* i, p. 198.
3 Sir A. Cunningham, *Ancient Geography of India*, p. 356.
4 *Vishnu Purāna*, trans. H. H. Wilson, 1840, p. 481.
5 E.T. Atkinson, *The Himalayan Districts of the North-western Provinces of India*, ii, 457 ff.
6 Beal, *op. cit.* ii, 240.
7 Iatar Sharif, *Islam in India*, 1921, p. 57. E. Westermarck. *The History of Human Marriage*, 5th ed. 1922. iii. 268.
8. Marco Polo, ed. Sir H. Yule, 1st ed. ii, 337 f.
9 *Malabar*, i, 287 f.

but ethnologically and geographically in the Maldive Islands [10]. According to Mr. Logan, there is a great excess of women in the island, as many of the men are absent for long periods on sea voyages. The women, though they are by religion Musalmans, appear openly unveiled, and take a lead in everything except navigation. They conducted the Census in 1876 by calling a woman from every house who told off the numbers with such readiness and propriety. After marriage the girls remain for a time with their parents, and leave the paternal home in order of seniority, the houses erected for them becoming their own property, and the men have no rights of ownership. It is easy to understand how mariners visiting the island could find none to receive them but women, and everything was arranged and managed by women. The men who remained in the island would probably keep out of the way until the strangers left, as they were pirates, and it would have fared ill with them if they were discovered.

The Chinese pilgrim's story of the Island of the Western Women is thus probably based on the marriage system which prevails among the Nayars and other people of Malabar under the system of Mother Right.

Other instances of the same legend are found in Assam where among the Nagas there is a tradition of a happy village in the far north-east peopled entirely by women, the population being kept up by the inhabitants receiving visits of traders from the surrounding tribes [11].

I have recorded these few examples in the hope that Indian scholars will interest themselves in the question, and that further enquiries will bring to light other instances of this remarkable legend."

—*Man in India.*

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10 *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, xvii, 360 f.
11 Sir E. A. Gait, *Census Report, Assam*, 1891, i, 250 f, J. H. Hutton, *The Angami Nāgas*, 263 f.